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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO., 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST CO., and 
COTTONWOOD THRIFT & LOAN CO., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
NO. 860340 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Whether plaintiff has waived its arguments as to 
issues no. 2 and 5.b. below by failing to properly raise these 
issues or arguments in the District Courtf. 
2. Whether the verification o£ plaintiff's notices 
of mechanics' lien required by former Ut^h Code Ann. § 38-1-7 
(1953 as amended) are invalid under § 46-+-1-8 due to the absence 
of the expiration date of the notary's commission and the 
absence of the notary's city or county o£ residence. 
3. Whether plaintiff's notice$ of lien also failed 
to substantially comply with other requirements of § 38-1-7 and 
requirements of § § 38-1-8 and 57-8-19 in asserting a single 
"blanket" lien claim against several buildings or condominium 
units on separately owned property, upon which work was done 
under two separte contracts, without separate notices of lien 
or allocation of the lien claim among the separate buildings, 
separate condominium units and common areas and facilities, 
separately owned property, and separate contracts. 
4. Whether plaintiff's lien claims against defendant 
Valley Bank and Trust Company are barred by plaintiff's failure 
to bring action against Valley Bank within the jurisdictional 
one year limitation period of § 38-1-11. 
a. Whether Valley Bank's actual or constructive 
knowledge of the recording of the lis pendens in this action 
avoids the jurisdictional requirement of § 38-1-11, where 
Valley Bank's security interest was acquired before the 
recording of both the lis pendens and plaintiff's notices of 
lien. 
b. Whether there was any unity of interest, 
based on the undisputed facts, as between Valley Bank and any 
of the defendants against whom this action was timely brought, 
sufficient for plaintiff's claims to relate back under Rule 
15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Whether plaintiff's lien claims against 
Cottonwood Thrift are barred by a release of lien recorded by 
plaintiff. 
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a. Whether the release was complete and 
unambiguous on its face as to the condomihium units in question. 
b. Whether there were any disputed questions of 
material fact in the record before the District Court regarding 
Cottonwood Thrift's induced detrimental reliance on the release 
of lien. 
6. Whether defendants are entitled to their 
reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in the District Court and 
on this appeal under § 38-1-18 and Rule 54(d)(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendants/Respondents Copper State Thrift & Loan 
Co. ("Copper State Thrift"), Cottonwood thrift & Loan Co. 
("Cottonwood Thrift"), and Valley Bank & Trust Co. ("Valley 
Bank") are all commercial lenders. This is an action under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 et. seq. (1953 3s amended) for 
foreclosure of alleged mechanics' liens by plaintiff/appellant 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. ("Projects Unlimited"), which claims 
that defendant Bradshaw Development Co., Inc. ("Bradshaw 
Development") (not a party to this appeal) owes it money for 
work performed pursuant to two contracts on eight units in the 
Highland Orchards Condominium Project, ftee, Complaint and 
Amended Complaint, Record on Appeal ("R.w) at 2, 242. Bradshaw 
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Development also was one of the owners of the property, and 
plaintiff Projects Unlimited was the general contractor. 
2. In particular, plaintiff claims that its 
mechanics1 liens are senior to certain recorded Deeds of Trust 
securing loans made by the defendant lenders on the condominium 
units as follows (R. 465): 
Trust Deed 
Unit No. Lender Recording Date 
PP-6-A1 Valley Bank 05-25-831/ 
Copper State Thrift 06-23-831/ 
FF-6-B1 Valley Bank 05-25-831/ 
Copper State Thrift 06-23-831/ 
FF-5-A1 Cottonwood Thrift 12-12-832/ 
FF-5-B1 Copper State Thrift 06-06-83 
FF-11-A1 Western Savings 09-07-832/ 
FF-11-A2 Cottonwood Thrift 12-12-83 
FF-11-B1 Copper State Thrift 06-06-83 
FF-11-B2 Copper State Thrift 06-06-83 
I/The Valley Bank long-term loans on Units FF-6-A1 
and FF-6-B1 secured by the May, 1983 Deeds of Trust were used 
to pay off earlier short-term construction loans of Copper 
State secured by Deeds of Trust recorded in December, 1982. To 
the extent that Copper State's construction loans were not paid 
off in this fashion, it took a junior security interest via the 
June, 1983 Deeds of Trust, and the December, 1982 Deeds of 
Trust are not at issue. R. 465. 
2/unit FF-5-A1 was subsequently acquired by 
non-parties to this appeal and is not at issue. 
.^Western Savings and Loan Co. ("Western Savings") 
also was a defendant, but plaintifffs claims against Western 
Savings have been settled and dismissed. R. 699. 
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3* Plaintiff commenced this action by Complaint 
dated March 16, 1984. Valley Bank was not named as a defendant 
in the initial Complaint. R. 2. Valley Bank was not named as 
a defendant until the filing of the Amended Complaint, more 
than one year after plaintiff's Notices op Lien (discussed 
below) contend that the last work was performed. R. 242. 
4. Plaintiff's mechanics' lien claims rely upon two 
recorded Notices of Lien, copies of which are attached to the 
Amended Complaint as Exhibits "A" and "B", respectively, and 
are also attached hereto as Addendum "A" and "B," 
respectively. Neither of the jurats exequted by the notary 
public on the two notices show either the date of expiration of 
the notary's commission, or the city or cjounty of the notary's 
residence. 
5. The Addendum "A" Notice of Lien was recorded on 
November 15, 1983 and contains only a metes and bounds legal 
description of the entire Highland Orchards Condominium Project 
as the description of the property lienecft, even though 
plaintiff only worked on eight units. Dwellings have not yet 
been built on the remaining units in the project. The Addendum 
"B" Notice of Lien, which appears to be an amendment to the 
Addendum "A" November, 1983 Notice of Lifen, was recorded on 
December 30, 1983 and contains the same legal description as 
the Addendum "A" Notice, and further describes the liened 
property by reference to a copy of what Appears to be a survey 
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of the Highland Orchards Condominium Project and by reference 
to a copy of a lien release. 
6. The condominium declaration and record of survey 
map for the Highland Orchards Condominium Project were recorded 
on August 30, 1983, prior to the recording of plaintiff's first 
Notice of Lien on the project, containing only the metes and 
bounds legal description. See, plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Carolyn Nielsen's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 423. 
1. Both Notices of Lien recite that the first work 
on the project was performed on October 10, 1982 and 
plaintiff's last work was performed on October 7, 1983. In 
response to Interrogatory No. 1 from defendants Kafesjian and 
Deseret Pacific Mortgage (not parties to this appeal), 
plaintiff admitted that in October, 1982, when plaintiff 
alleges that work on the project commenced and its lien arose, 
not all of the property subject to the lien claim was owned by 
Bradshaw Development. R. 628. In response to Copper State 
Thrift's Interrogatory No. 1, and contrary to the Notices of 
Lien, plaintiff admits that the work on the two FF-5 and four 
FF-11 units was not commenced until April 23, 1983. R. 467. 
Plaintiff's work on these six units was done pursuant to a 
contract dated April 12, 1983, after the work was done on the 
two FF-6 units pursuant to a contract dated September 15, 
1982. Both contracts show the specific location of each unit 
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and describe Highland Orchards as a condominium project. Both 
contracts show that the contract prices were allocated on a 
per-unit basis. See, Complaint, R. 2 et seg. 
8. By lien release dated December 6, 1983, plaintiff 
released Units FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1 from its mechanics' lien 
claims in exchange for payment of $85,000 from the proceeds of 
loans made by Cottonwood Thrift, secured )py the Deeds of Trust 
recorded on these units on December 12, 1983. The facts 
surrounding this lien release were established by the Affidavit 
of Charles Brazier, which was unrebutted by plaintiff, and a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum "C". R. 672. The 
lien release was given prior to Cottonwood Thrift's loans in 
order to induce Cottonwood Thrift to makel the loans so that 
plaintiff could be paid from the proceeds. But for the lien 
release, Cottonwood Thrift would not have made these loans, and 
Cottonwood Thrift relied upon the lien release in making the 
loans. Subsequent to giving the lien reliease, plaintiff 
accepted $85,000 in proceeds from the Cottonwood Thrift loans. 
However, after the Cottonwood Thrift loahs were made, this lien 
release was attached to plaintiff's second Notice of Lien 
recorded December 30, 1983 as part of the property 
description. See also, Amended Complaint and Affidavit of John 
Bradshaw, R. 460, 242 et_ seg. A side agreement between 
Projects Unlimited and Bradshaw Development regarding the lien 
releases was made and recorded some six Months after the 
Cottonwood Thrift loans were made. R. 543. 
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9# Although, in affidavits from David Mast and Phil 
Hostetter, plaintiff contended it was induced by Copper State 
Thrift to do certain work on the project, affidavits from 
Donald S. Poulton and Steve Beckstead of Copper State Thrift 
disputed these allegations, contending, among other things, 
that Projects Unlimited was requested not to commence work 
until after the Copper State Thrift trust deeds were recorded, 
and that the amount of the lien claim was in dispute. R. 487, 
508, 537, 629, 632. Further, defendants moved to strike the 
portions of plaintiff's affidavits relating to amount, on 
grounds that those allegations were conclusory, without 
evidentiary foundation, and not allocated on a per-unit basis. 
R. 576. Also, plaintiff admitted that it continued to work on 
the project even after being informed by Bradshaw Development 
that no further funds were available from Copper State Thrift 
to pay for that work. R. 526. 
10. Based upon the foregoing record, on March 21, 
1986 the District Court (Judge Billings) heard argument on the 
cross-motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiff (against 
only Copper State Thrift), and defendants Copper State Thrift, 
Cottonwood Thrift, Valley Bank and Western Savings. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court granted the motion of 
defendant Cottonwood Thrift based on the release of lien, 
granted the motion of defendant Valley Bank based upon the 
statute of limitations, and dismissed defendant Western Savings 
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based upon stipulation of counsel. R. 683, 698. Further, the 
Court took under advisement the cross-motions of plaintiff and 
defendant Copper State Thrift and granted plaintiff leave to 
file a memorandum addressing the issue of whether, under former 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1953) requiring that plaintiff's 
notices of lien be verified, these notices were invalid because 
the notary's jurat failed to set forth the notary's city or 
county of residence and the expiration date of the notary's 
commission, as required by § 46-1-8. R. 683, 698. 
11. Plaintiff elected not to file a memorandum 
addressing the above issue, and on March 28, 1986, the Court 
entered its Memorandum Decision ruling that plaintiff's notices 
of lien failed to substantially comply with §§ 46-1-8 and 
38-1-7. R. 684. A copy of the Memorandulm Decision is attached 
to plaintiff's Brief on this appeal. Pursuant to Rule 4 of the 
Third District Court Rules, defendants mailed a proposed Order 
and Judgment of Dismissal to all counsel of record on April 9, 
1986. R. 702. On April 14, 1986, Ellen IMaycock withdrew as 
counsel for plaintiff, and on April 15, 1986, present counsel 
Robert F. Babcock entered his appearance as new counsel for 
plaintiff. R. 692, 695. Neither new counsel nor former 
counsel for plaintiff objected to entry of the Order mailed on 
April 9, and on April 21, 1986, that Ord^r was entered. 
R. 698. Notice of Entry of that Order was served by mail on 
May 6, 1986. R. 723. That Order states^ among other things, 
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that it was based not only on the Memorandum Decision and other 
grounds set forth in the Order, but also, ". . .on grounds 
otherwise set forth in the moving defendants1 memoranda on 
file. . . .". A copy of that Order is attached hereto as 
Addendum "D". 
12. On May 1, 1986, plaintiff filed a Motion to 
Reconsider, arguing for the first time that the provisions of 
§ 46-1-8 do not apply to the verification required by former 
§ 38-1-7, and arguing issues of statutory construction already 
considered by the Court. R. 704. These arguments are now 
restated as Argument I in plaintiff's Brief at pp. 11-24. On 
May 7, 1986, by minute entry and telephone call to plaintiff's 
counsel, the District Court ruled that the plaintiff's Motion 
to Reconsider would be stricken, stating that, "The Court feels 
there is no just cause for bringing such a motion before the 
Court." R. 726. Nonetheless, on May 14, 1986, plaintiff filed 
the Affidavit of Glenn M. Acomb and the Affidavit of Frank 
Nelson, upon which Argument I of plaintiff's Brief here is 
based in part, and these two affidavits are attached as the 
final addenda to that Brief, even though they were not 
considered by the District Court. R. 727, 729. Subsequent to 
the filing of plaintiff's Notice of Appeal on May 21, 1986, 
defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to 
Reconsider, not knowing that motion had been stricken. R. 736. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based upon the undisputed facts in the record, the 
District Court properly ruled that defendants/respondents 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., Cottonwood Thrift & Loan 
Company and Valley Bank & Trust Company were entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. As ito all of these 
defendants, plaintiff's mechanics' lien claims are barred 
because the notices of lien recorded by plaintiff failed to 
substantially comply with Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7, 38-1-8 and 
57-8-19 (1953 as amended) in a number of respects. As to 
defendant Valley Bank & Trust Company, plaintiff's lien claims 
are also barred by its failure to bring action on these claims 
against Valley Bank within the jurisdictional one year period 
specified in § 38-1-11. As to defendant Cottonwood Thrift & 
Loan Company, plaintiff's lien claims are also barred by 
plaintiff's releases of lien. 
On the question of substantial compliance with the 
statutory requirements pertaining to plaintiff's notices of 
lien, because of the extraordinary rights and liabilities 
created by the mechanics' lien statutes, this Court is no 
longer willing to resolve every issue in favor of the lien 
claimant. The words "substantial compliance11 are no longer 
just magic words used by a lien claimant to avoid the 
consequences of the failure to comply. Instead, this Court is 
now taking a hard look at whether compliance with statutory 
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requirements really has been "substantial", before permitting 
enforcement of the unique rights created by these same statutes. 
A hard look at the plaintiff's conduct here reveals 
not only statutory noncompliance, but also an attempt to use 
this noncompliance to gain rights even broader than those 
plaintiff would have had if it followed the statutes. 
Plaintiff failed to comply with statutory requirements 
pertaining to notices of lien in the following respects, which 
are "substantial" either when considered individually or 
cumulatively. 
1. The verification of plaintiff's notices of lien 
required by former § 38-1-7 violated § 46-1-8 by failing to 
include the expiration date of the notary's commission and by 
failing to include the city or county of the notary's 
residence. Moreover, despite being requested by the District 
Court to submit a memorandum setting forth any arguments it had 
on this issue, plaintiff failed to do so until after the 
District Court had already ruled, when it was too late, and it 
is now also too late for plaintiff to raise these arguments on 
appeal. 
2. Plaintiff also failed to comply with other 
requirements of § 38-1-7 and with related requirements of 
§§ 38-1-8 and 57-8-19 in recording a "blanket" notice of lien 
claim against several separate buildings or condominium units 
on separately owned property, upon which work was done under 
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two separate contracts, without recording separate notices of 
lien or allocating the lien claim among the separate buildings, 
separate condominium units and common areas and facilities, 
separately owned property and separate contracts. 
In addition, the failure of plaintiff to bring 
action against Valley Bank within the jurisdictional one year 
period of § 38-1-11 is not avoided by Valley Bank's actual or 
constructive knowledge of the recording of the lis pendens in 
this action. Valley Bank's security interest was acquired 
before either plaintiff's notices of lien or the lis pendens 
were recorded. Also, based on the undisputed facts, there was 
no unity of interest as between Valley Bank and any of the 
original defendants to this action sufficient for plaintiff's 
claims to relate back under Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Further, the legal issue of the interpretation of 
the lien release as to Cottonwood Thrift was correctly resolved 
by the District Court's determination that the lien release was 
complete and unambiguous on its face as to the condominium 
units in question. Cottonwood Thrift's detrimental reliance on 
the lien release was established by the undisputed facts in the 
record before the District Court, and once again, it is too 
late for plaintiff to dispute these fact£ for the first time in 
this appeal. 
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Finally, under § 38-1-18 and Rule 54(d)(1), 
defendants are entitled to an award of their reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred both in the District Court and on 
appeal, even though no award of fees has yet been made in the 
District Court. Under § 38-1-18, a party that successfully 
defends against a mechanics' lien claim is entitled to 
attorneys' fees incurred in the lower court and on appeal, to 
be taxed as costs. Under Rule 54 (d)(1), the prevailing party 
is entitled to costs unless the lower court otherwise orders, 
with the award of costs to await appeal on the merits so that 
the prevailing party can be finally determined. Accordingly, 
the finality of the District Court's Rule 54(b) order here, is 
not disturbed. The issue of attorneys' fees was raised in the 
pleadings of both plaintiff and defendants, and assuming the 
District Court is affirmed, this Court should remand for a 
determination as to the amount of fees reasonably incurred by 
defendants in the District Court and on appeal, under AAA 
Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 
289 (Utah 1986). Alternatively, the remand should grant 
defendants leave to file a motion for attorneys' fees in the 
District Court, to be determined by the District Court in 
accordance with this Court's determination of defendants as the 
prevailing parties. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUPREME COURT MAY NOT CONSIDER LEGAL 
OR FACTUAL ISSUES ON THE MERITS NOT PROPERLY 
PRESENTED TO THE DISTRICT COURT. 
As set forth above, the Districti Court specifically 
and expressly gave plaintiff the opportunity to brief the issue 
of whether the failure of the jurats on plaintiff's Notices of 
Lien to set forth the expiration date of the notary's 
commission, and the city or county of the notary's residence, 
invalidated those notices under Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-8 (1953 
as amended) and former § 38-1-7. Plaintiff elected not to 
avail itself of that opportunity, and the District Court ruled 
against plaintiff on that issue. 
Plaintiff then changed counsel f|or purposes of filing 
a motion to reconsider, asserting arguments on this issue that 
should have been asserted, if they had any merit, when the 
District Court asked for those arguments. Plaintiff's change 
in counsel provided no basis for plaintiff's assertion of new 
arguments after the District Court had already ruled, and the 
District Court properly denied the motiorl to reconsider. 
Plaintiff then improperly filed the Acomb and Nelson 
affidavits, in an attempt to have those affidavits considered 
as part of the record on this appeal. 
Plaintiff's central argument on its appeal (Argument I 
at pp. 11-24 of its Brief) merely restates the same arguments 
that were not submitted in time for consideration by the 
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District Court. Because these issues were not timely raised in 
the District Court, they may not be raised for the first time 
on this appeal, or considered by the Supreme Court. See, Utah 
County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 1983) (reversing lower court 
on other issues). Because the Acomb and Nelson affidavits (the 
final two addenda to plaintiff's Brief) were not filed until 
after even the Motion to Reconsider was denied, these 
affidavits may not be considered by the Supreme Court as part 
of the record on this appeal. See, Bradford v. Simpson, 541 
P.2d 612 (Idaho 1975); Simpson Timber Co. v. Ljutic Industries, 
Inc., 463 P.2d 243 (Wash. App. 1969); Hudesman v. Foley, 441 
P.2d 532 (Wash. 1968) (reversing lower court on other issues). 
However, as will be seen in the following argument, 
even if these arguments and affidavits could be considered by 
the Supreme Court, they are without merit, and the District 
Court's ruling remains entirely correct. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
WHERE THE VERIFICATION REQUIRED BY FORMER 
§ 38-1-7 IS CERTIFIED BY A NOTARY PUBLIC, 
THAT VERIFICATION MUST ALSO MEET THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF § 46-1-8 IN ORDER TO SUBSTANTIALLY 
COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
NOTICES OF LIEN. 
Plaintiff argues that the provisions of Title 57, 
governing the form of documents conveying real estate, are the 
sole provisions that govern the form of the verification 
required by former § 38-1-7, which stated, prior to 1985, that 
the notice of lien claim "must be verified by the oath" of the 
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claimant or some other person. A copy of § 38-1-7 showing the 
1985 amendments is attached hereto as Addendum "E". However, 
it is doubtful that Title 57 ever applied to the form of the 
§ 38-1-7 notice. Even if Title 57 did apply, Title 46 also 
applied. 
Plaintiff relies upon §§ 57-1-6 and 57-2-5 which 
state, respectively: 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart 
notice - Operation and effect - Interest of 
person not named in instrument. 
Every conveyance of real estate, and 
every instrument of writing setting forth an 
agreement to convey any real estate or 
whereby any real estate may be ^ffected, to 
operate as notice to third persons shall be 
proved or acknowledged and certified in the 
manner prescribed by this title and recorded 
in the office of the recorder of the county 
in which such real estate is situated, . . . 
57-2-5. Certificate of acknowledgment. 
Every officer who shall take the proof 
or acknowledgment of any conveyance 
affecting any real estate shall make a 
certificate thereof, and cause $uch 
certificate to be endorsed on ot annexed to 
such conveyance. Such certificate shall be: 
(1) When made by any judge or clerk, 
under the hand of such judge or clerk, and 
the seal of the court. 
(2) When made by any other officer, 
under the hand and official seal of such 
officer. 
The scope of § 57-1-6 is unclear. However, the only 
requirement that a notice of mechanic's lien be acknowledged 
and certified appears to have come from the verification 
requirement of former § 38-1-7, not from Title 57. Section 
38-1-7, as amended subsequent to the recording of plaintiff's 
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notices of lienf now contains no acknowledgment or 
certification requirement as plaintiff concedes. Certainly, if 
the legislature had felt that the acknowledgment and 
certification requirements of Title 57 applied even once the 
verification requirement was deleted from § 38-1-7, the 
legislature also would have amended § 57-1-6 to exclude notices 
of mechanic's lien from the acknowledgment and certification 
requirements of that statute. Since no amendment to § 57-1-6 
was made, and § 38-1-7 in its present form does not require 
acknowledgment or certification of a notice of lien, the 
legislature certainly felt that the requirements of Title 57 
never applied to notices of lien. Moreover, this Court has 
already held that mere compliance with the acknowledgment and 
certification requirements of Title 57 does not meet the 
verification requirements of former § 38-1-7. First Security 
Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981). 
Even if Title 57 did apply to notices of lien, it is 
clear from Title 57 that these were not the exclusive 
requirements. For example, § 57-2-5, quoted above, provides 
that in addition to judges and court clerks, the acknowledgment 
required by § 57-1-6 may be certified by other "officers" who 
must certify by affixing their "hand" and "official seal" to 
the acknowledgment. However, Title 57 does not identify who 
these "officers" are, or define what is intended by the "hand" 
and "official seal" requirements. It is only by reference to 
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Title 46, Chapter 1, that one can determine that under 
§ 46-1-5, notaries public are among the "officers" empowered to 
certify Title 57 acknowledgments, that under § 46-1-7 there are 
certain requirements for that officer's "seal", and that under 
§ 46-1-8, the "hand" of that officer includes the officer's 
signature, official title, place of residence, and the 
expiration of the officer's commission: 
46-1-5. Powers. 
Notaries public may exercige the 
following powers within this st^te: 
Administer all oaths provided by law, 
acknowledge powers of attorney and all such 
instruments of writing conveying or 
affecting property in any part of this 
state, or elsewhere as may be l4wful; take 
affidavits and depositions; makQ 
declarations and protests; and c|o all other 
acts usually done by notaries piiblic. 
46-1-7. Seal. 
Each notary public shall have an 
official seal, with which he shall 
authenticate all of his official acts. It 
must contain the words "State of Utah," and 
"Notary Public" or "Notarial Seal," with the 
surname and at least the initials of his 
Christian name. 
46-1-8. Affix to signature place of 
residence and date commission expires. 
To all acknowledgments, oaths, 
affirmations and instruments of every kind 
taken and certified by a notary public, he 
shall affix to his signature his official 
title and his place of residence and the 
date on which his commission expires. 
(emphasis added). 
The fact that the form of acknowledgment and 
certification set forth in § 57-2-7, also cited by plaintiff, 
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does not contain a space designated for the notary's residence 
and commission expiration date is irrelevant , since that form 
also does not contain a space designated for the notary's 
signature or seal. In sumf it is clear that even if Title 57 
did apply to notices of mechanic's lien, Title 57 necessarily 
incorporates the requirements of Title 46, and the District 
Court was entirely correct in ruling that § 46-1-8 does apply 
to the verification required by former § 38-1-7. 
Plaintiff also makes related statutory construction 
arguments that the provisions of § 46-1-8 are not mandatory, 
and that plaintiff has substantially complied with statutory 
requirements. However, these arguments were expressly 
considered in the District Court's Memorandum Decision and were 
correctly rejected for the reasons set forth in that Decision, 
which will not be restated here. The District Court did not 
rely upon the decision in In re: Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (D. 
Utah 1984), it simply reviewed the same statutes and Utah 
Supreme Court cases as were considered in Williamson, and 
reached the same result. Moreover, the result reached both in 
Williamson, and in the District Court here, is entirely 
consistent with the prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
on these issues, invalidating notices of lien under former 
§ 38-1-7, for failure to meet the verification requirements of 
that statute. See, Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721 
(Utah 1983); First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra. As 
stated in Williamson: 
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Although, in Utah, substantial 
compliance with these technicalities is 
sufficient to create validity, Nevertheless, 
the absence of an essential element has been 
held by the Utah Supreme Court to render an 
otherwise valid lien notice technically 
defective. . . . [I]f the notary had 
appended on the certificate his commission 
expiration date—regardless of its form, 
completeness, position or even accuracy— 
then there would have been a basis for 
finding substantial compliance with Utah 
law. But the complete absence qf an 
essential element of an oath, acknowledge-
ment, or jurat is, in Utah, fatal to the 
validity of the lien notice. 
43 B.R. at 824 (citations omitted). 
As shown above, it is plaintiff's analysis that is 
flawed, not that of the Utah Bankruptcy Court in Williamson, or 
of the District Court here. The existence of a notarial master 
list or of decisions from other jurisdictions with other 
statutes does not change the plain requirements of the Utah 
statutes. As with the Supreme Court's decisions in Graff and 
First Security, supra, the impact of the District Court's 
decision on the construction industry is irrelevant, and 
minimal in any event, because of the 1985 amendment to § 38-1-7 
deleting the verification requirement, ^ee, Addendum "E" 
hereto. The District Court's Memorandum Decision was 
well-reasoned, sound, and there is no ba^is for reversing the 
merits of that decision. This Court has consistently ruled 
that in order to invoke the substantial benefits of the 
mechanics' lien statute, a lien claimant must comply with the 
statutory requirements, which plaintiff failed to do here. 
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III. PLAINTIFF'S NOTICES OF LIEN ALSO FAILED TO 
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH OTHER REQUIRE-
MENTS OF § 38-1-7 AND WITH RELATED 
REQUIREMENTS OF §§ 38-1-8 AND 57-8-19. 
In their memoranda filed in the District Court on the 
cross-motions for summary judgment, defendants/respondents 
argued that plaintiff's notices of lien also failed to comply 
with statutory requirements other than the verification 
requirements of former § 38-1-7. R. 464, 580. These arguments 
are restated below. Although these arguments were not 
addressed in the District Court's Memorandum Decision, the 
Order and Judgment of Dismissal (Addendum "D" hereto) states at 
p.3 that it is also based ". . .on grounds otherwise set forth 
in the moving defendants' memoranda on file . . .". Moreover, 
to the extent that the Judgment is also supported by grounds 
timely raised below, other than those relied upon by the 
District Court, those grounds may also be used by this Court in 
affirming that Judgment. See, Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar 
Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980). Also, to the 
extent that individual instances of noncompliance with the 
statutory requirements for notices of lien are not 
"substantial", these instances certainly become "substantial" 
when considered cumulatively. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1953) states: 
38-1-8. Liens on several separate 
properties in one claim. 
Liens against two or more buildings, 
mining claims or other improvements owned by 
the same person or persons may be included 
-22-
in one claim; but in such case t|ie person 
filing the claim must designate therein the 
amount claimed to be due to him on each of 
such buildings, mining claims or other 
improvements. 
Under § 38-1-8 as interpreted in Utah Savings & Loan 
Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 36£ P.2d 598 (Utah 
1961), plaintiff was permitted to record $ single notice of 
lien as to the separate buildings only if all of the property 
was owned by the same person. Even then, § 38-1-8 requires 
that the single notice allocate the amount of the claim as 
between the separate buildings, although the enforceability of 
this requirement under Mecham depends upon the nature of the 
interest of the party seeking enforcement. 
In contrast, the requirement of separate notices of 
lien for separately owned buildings is absolute under Mecham, 
and invalidates the lien claims of those who fail to comply. 
Plaintiff has admitted that in October, 1982, when it claims 
work was commenced on the project, as well as thereafter, part 
of the property upon which separate buildings were constructed 
was owned by others than Bradshaw Development. R. 628. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's notices of lien are barred by 
§ 38-1-8, as well as by the verification requirements of former 
§ 38-1-7. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19 (1953 ap amended) states that 
subsequent to the recordation of a condominium declaration, "no 
lien shall thereafter arise or be effective against the 
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property." This statute goes on to state that once the 
condominium declaration is recorded: 
. . . liens or encumbrances shall arise or be 
created only against each unit and the 
percentage of undivided interest in the common 
areas and facilities appurtenant to such unit 
in the same manner and under the same 
conditions in every respect as liens or 
encumbrances may arise or be created upon or 
against any other separate parcel of real 
property subject to undivided ownership . . . 
In addition to the verification formerly required, 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1953 as amended) has always required 
that the recorded Notice of Lien contain, among other things, 
"the time when the first and last labor was performed, or the 
first and last material was furnished", and a property 
description "sufficient for identification". Prior to 1985, 
§ 38-1-7 also required the lien claimant to include in the 
Notice of Lien "a statement of his demand after deducting all 
just credits and offsets," and "a statement of the terms, time 
given and conditions of his contract...". See, Addendum "E" 
hereto. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's lien claims also are barred 
because although both Notices of Lien were recorded subsequent 
to the recording of the Highland Orchards condominium 
declaration, neither notice complies either with the 
requirements of § 57-8-19 or the requirements of § 38-1-7 in 
effect at the time of recording. Instead, both Notices of Lien 
purport to claim a blanket lien against the entire property, 
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without limiting the claim to the individual units upon which 
work was done, or to separate amounts claimed as to those 
individual units. Also, the notices fail to distinguish 
between the work done under different contracts at different 
times• 
In the District Court, plaintiff contended that the 
requirements of § 57-8-19 do not apply because plaintiff's 
Notices of Lien relate back to the performance of the first 
labor, which pre-dated the recording of the condominium 
declaration. In so contending, plaintiff relied only upon 
decisions from other jurisdictions, Stevens Construction Corp. 
v. Draper Hall, Inc., 242 N.W. 2d 893 (Wise. 1976) and 
Hostetter v. Inland Development Corp. of Montana, 561 P.2d 1323 
(Mont. 1977). 
However, these cases are distinguishable from the case 
at hand because the work done by plaintiff here was done under 
two separate contracts, each of which specifically designated 
the individual units upon which work was to be performed, and 
both of which referred to the project as a condominium 
project. Both Stevens and Hostetter indicate that a single 
blanket lien of the type recorded by plaintiff is valid only 
where the work is done under a single contract. If the work is 
done on different portions of the property under separate 
contracts, as here, a single, blanket lien is inadequate under 
the rationale of these cases, because the lien claimant has a 
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basis for segregating his claims as between the work done under 
the separate contracts. Again, this is especially true here, 
where the two contracts not only identify the specific units 
that are the subject of each contract, but also show the 
specific location of each unit and identify the project as a 
condominium project. 
Moreover, as the result of these defects in 
plaintiff's blanket Notices of Lien, these notices fail to 
substantially comply with the above-quoted requirements for 
such notices in § 38-1-7. Plaintiff's notices here fail to 
adequately describe the property subject to the lien, with 
reference to the specific units identified and located in the 
two contracts, and fail to segregate plaintiff's lien claims as 
between the work done on the first contract and the work done 
on the second contract, and as between the various units. 
These notices also fail to state that the work done under the 
second contract was not commenced until April, 1983, as 
plaintiff has admitted. 
These are not just technical defects but represent an 
obvious attempt to gain lien rights to which plaintiff is not 
entitled, through the giving of misleading, if not falsified, 
information in the Notices of Lien. Plaintiff clearly was 
aware of these problems at the time it recorded its second 
Notice of Lien, amending the first notice, yet plaintiff chose 
not to correct these mistakes, and instead compounded them. By 
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also including a survey map of the entire Condominium Project 
as part of the property description in th^ second notice, 
without designating upon which of the units work was performed, 
plaintiff purported to claim a lien against undeveloped units 
upon which it did no work. As discussed in the preceding 
argument, mechanics1 liens are statutory creations, and the 
failure to substantially comply with these statutes invalidates 
the liens, regardless of when the liens aire alleged to have 
arisen. 
Finally, plaintiff does not appear to seek reversal of 
the District Court's denial of plaintiff's cross-motion for 
summary judgment against Copper State Thrift only. In the 
conclusion at p.30 of its Brief, plaintiff asks "that this 
Court remand the case for trial on the merits", apparently 
conceding that material fact disputes in the record before the 
District Court prevented plaintiff's own tnotion from being 
granted. To the extent this does not accurately reflect 
plaintiff's position, defendants point out that the Affidavit 
of Donald S. Poulton (R. 632) and the Affidavit of Steve 
Beckstead (R. 629), along with defendants' motion to strike 
(R. 576) the portions of plaintiff's affidavits relating to the 
total amount of the lien claim, established either that there 
was an inadequate evidentiary basis in the record for 
determination of the total amount of the claim, or that there 
were material fact disputes in the recordl as to that amount. 
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See also, Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, referred 
to in both the Poulton and Beckstead affidavits. 
Similarly, even if Stevens and Hostettec, supra, do 
apply* and plaintiff's lien claim arose before the recording of 
the Highland Orchards condominium declaration, these same cases 
hold that once the declaration is recorded, plaintiff's 
"blanket" lien claim is transformed into a proportionate claim 
against individual units. Accordingly, there were also 
unresolved factual questions concerning allocation of the total 
amount of plaintiff's lien claim among the various condominium 
units and common areas and facilities. In this regard, see 
defendants' Reply Memorandum in the District Court, at pp. 
12-14 (R. 591-593). Although these factual issues prevented 
plaintiff's motion from being granted, they do not apply to the 
grounds upon which defendants' motion was granted. 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S UNTIMELY FILING OF ITS LIEN 
CLAIMS AGAINST VALLEY BANK IN THIS ACTION 
IS A JURISDICTIONAL BAR TO THOSE CLAIMS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11, quoted in plaintiff's Brief 
at pp. 24-25, contains two requirements that must be met. The 
first is that the lien foreclosure action must be commenced 
within one year after the completion of the contract. The 
second is that within this same period, a lis pendens must be 
recorded. If the action is timely filed but the lis pendens is 
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not recorded, the lien claim is void except as to parties to 
the action and those with actual knowledge of the action. 
Plaintiff's recording of a lis pendens and Valley Bank's 
apparent knowledge of the lis pendens satisfy the second 
statutory requirement, but not the first. Section 38-1-13, 
also quoted in plaintiff's Brief at p. 24, applies to the 
joinder of lien claimants, not to the joinder of parties 
against whom the lien is asserted. 
Under AAA Fencing Co. vs. Raintree Development and 
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986), also discussed in 
plaintiff's Brief, the untimely filing of a mechanics' lien 
foreclosure action is jurisdictional, rather than just a 
defense. Enforcement of the lien is barred even against one 
who purchases liened property with knowledge of the lien and 
fails to raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense. Unless the rationale of AAA Fencing also applies 
here, the statute of limitations against non-parties would 
never run, once the lis pendens is timely recorded or the 
non-parties otherwise learn of the action. Also, the purpose 
of requiring the recording of a lis pendens is to give notice 
to those who acquire their interest in the property subsequent 
to the filing of the action, and who can protect their 
interests through a title search. Here, Valley Bank acquired 
its interest before even the notices of lien were recorded, and 
could not protect itself through a title search. Accordingly, 
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the District Court correctly stated in the Order and Judgment 
of Dismissal "that neither Valley Bank's actual nor 
constructive knowledge of the recorded Lis Pendens excused the 
failure to bring action against Valley Bank within the 
statutory period." 
Plaintiff's only other argument around the statute of 
limitations is that the Amended Complaint relates back to the 
original Complaint under Rule 15(c) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as interpreted in Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 
902 (Utah 1976). In Doxey-Layton/ the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that, generally, the relation back provisions of Rule 
15(c) do not apply to extend the statute of limitations for 
claims asserted against a party added for the first time by 
amended pleading: 
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will 
not apply to an amendment which substitutes 
or adds new parties for those brought before 
the court by the original pleadings -
whether plaintiff or defendant. This for 
the reason that such would amount to the 
assertion of a new cause of action, and if 
such were allowed to relate back to the 
filing of the complaint, the purpose of a 
statute of limitation would be defeated. 
548 P.2d at 906. 
There, the plaintiff brought a quiet title action and 
the question was whether the statute of limitations had run on 
defendants' counterclaim. Two of the originally named 
defendants had died prior to the filing of the action, and 
their heirs were subsequently substituted as parties defendant 
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(and counterclaim plaintiffs) by amended pleadings. The Court 
indicated that the unity of interest between the decedents and 
their heirs, who were the real parties in interest in the quiet 
title action, created a limited exception to the general rule 
and allowed the substitution of parties tp relate back to the 
filing of the original complaint. 
Doxey-Layton doesn't apply to the case at hand for 
several reasons. First, in Doxey-Layton the party asserting 
the statute of limitations was already a named party in the 
original complaint. In effect, the issue was whether new 
plaintiffs (i.e. defendants asserting counterclaims) could be 
substituted after the statute had run, not whether new 
defendants could be added. Here, Valley Bank was not named as 
a party until after the one year statute of limitations had run. 
Second, in Doxey-Layton the court also applied the 
rule (not applicable here) that the filing of the complaint 
tolled the statutes of limitations on counterclaims arising 
from the facts set forth in the complaint. Since even the 
defendants' original counterclaim in Doxey-Layton was time 
barred but for the application of this tolling rule, the 
court's application of the relation back tule [Rule 15(c)] may 
have been dictum. 
Third, Doxey-Layton was a quiet title action in which 
the decedents' heirs became the real parties in interest as a 
matter of law upon the death of the decedents (which had 
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occurred even prior to the filing of the lawsuit) and all that 
was involved was a pro forma substitution of parties. Here, 
based on the undisputed facts, there is no unity of interest 
between Valley Bank and any of the originally named defendants, 
as is made clear by this Court's subsequent decision in Perry 
v, Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). 
In Perry, third party plaintiff Perry furnished the 
doors on a construction project as a subcontractor and was sued 
by the general contractor in a breach of contract action 
alleging that the doors were defective. Perry had ordered the 
doors from a supplier, who in turn obtained them from the 
manufacturer. Perry contended that his third party complaints 
against the supplier and manufacturer should relate back to the 
filing of the original complaint against Perry. The trial 
court disagreed and ruled on summary judgment that the third 
party claims were time barred. On appeal, this Court affirmed, 
holding that privity of contract does not create the unity of 
interest required by Doxey-Layton; 
'Identity of interest1 as used in this 
context means that the parties are so 
closely related in their business operations 
that notice of the action against one serves 
to provide notice of the action to the 
other. Such an identity exists, for 
example, between past and present forms of 
the same enterprise. . . . In this case, 
there was no evidence showing any identity 
of interest between the original plaintiff, 
the defendant, and the third party 
defendants other than privity of contract. 
This is an insufficient identity of interest 
for the purpose of Rule 15(c). If any third 
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party action automatically related back to 
the date of filing of the original 
complaint, Rule 15(c) would become an 
all-encompassing rule that would eliminate 
all limitations on third-party actions. The 
law is otherwise. 
681 P.2d at 217 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, here, there is no evidence of any 
relationship between Valley Bank and any of the originally 
named parties to this action, such that notice to any of these 
original parties of claims against them constituted notice to 
Valley Bank of a claim against Valley Bank. Defendant Copper 
State Thrift (an originally-named defendant) claims June, 1983 
security interests in Units FF-6-A1 and FP-6-B1 junior to 
Valley Bank's May, 1983 security interests in those units. 
Valley Bank's loans on these units were long-term loans used to 
pay off the bulk of earlier Copper State Thrift short-term 
construction loans. Copper State Thrift's June, 1983 Deeds of 
Trust were taken to secure the unpaid balance of its earlier 
construction loans. 
However, neither the recording op the lis pendens nor 
notice to Copper State Thrift in the original Complaint of 
plaintiff's intention to foreclose Copper State Thrift's June, 
1983 security interests for the construction loans, constituted 
notice to Valley Bank of plaintiff's intention to foreclose 
Valley Bank's separate, senior security interests of May, 1983 
securing entirely different loans made for different purposes. 
See also, Union Tank & Pipe Co. v. Mammoth Oil Co., 25 P.2d 262 
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(Cal* App. 1933); Anderson v. Gousset, 208 N.E. 2d 37 (111. 
App. 1965), holding that the addition of omitted parties by 
amended pleadings in a mechanics1 lien foreclosure action does 
not relate back to the original pleadings for purposes of 
avoiding the statute of limitations. 
In sum, even if there was a relationship between 
Copper State Thrift and Valley Bank akin to privity of 
contract, this would be inadequate under Perry. Also, the 
interests of junior and senior lienholders are not necessarily 
the same. There was no relationship between Valley Bank and 
any of the original defendants sufficient to meet unity of 
interest standards under either Doxey-Layton or Perry, Valley 
Bank's motion for summary judgment was properly granted on this 
ground as well. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF'S LIEN RELEASES 
WERE UNAMBIGUOUS ON THEIR FACE AND THAT 
COTTONWOOD THRIFT'S DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE ON 
THOSE LIEN RELEASES WAS UNDISPUTED. 
The issue of whether a document is or is not ambiguous 
on its face is an issue of law. See, Morris v. Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah, 1983). The 
lien release at issue is included as an exhibit to plaintiff's 
Amended Notice of Lien, attached as Addendum "B" hereto. 
Although the lien release is captioned as a "partial" release, 
it was complete on its face as to the two units identified as 
being released (FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1, with the latter unit no 
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longer at issue). The release was "partial" only in the sense 
that the lien being released covered othe^ : units and property 
as well, which were not being released, ^ny other 
interpretation is unreasonable as a matter of law in light of 
the plain language of the release, as the District Court 
determined. 
Although plaintiff now contends bhat there were fact 
issues as to whether Cottonwood Thrift reasonably relied upon 
the release, plaintiff did not raise these issues in the 
District Court. Plaintiff's affidavits contested some of the 
allegations in the Affidavit of John Bradshaw submitted by 
defendants, but not the allegations in that affidavit, or the 
Affidavit of Charles Brazier (also submitted by defendants), 
that: 
1. Plaintiffs gave the lien release in order to 
induce Cottonwood Thrift to make loans secured by the released 
units, from which plaintiff received $85,000 in proceeds; and 
2. Cottonwood Thrift would not have made these loans 
without a complete release as to the two Units securing the 
loans, and plaintiffs would have received nothing without such 
a release. 
Plaintiff's arguments that the Affidavit of Charles 
Brazier was conclusory and should not have been considered by 
the District Court are also made for the first time on this 
appeal and come too late. Plaintiff filed no opposing 
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affidavit, no motion to strike the Brazier affidavit, no 
affidavit under Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
plaintiff did not dispute the reliance issue in its Statement 
of Undisputed Facts in the District Court. R. 524 e± seg. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Frisbee v. K & K Construction 
Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984) is also misplaced. There, the 
document at issue was ambiguous on its face, and the affidavit 
at issue set forth none of the underlying facts. Here, the 
lien release is unambiguous on its face, and both the Brazier 
and the Bradshaw affidavits set forth the facts establishing 
Cottonwood Thrift's reliance, and the basis for that reliance, 
in detail. Plaintiff failed to controvert those facts below, 
and may not do so on this appeal. See, Franklin Financial v. 
New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). 
Nothing short of a complete release as to the two 
units would have conferred any benefit or protection to 
Cottonwood Thrift sufficient to induce it to make the loans. 
It was duplicitous at best for plaintiff to re-assert its lien 
claims against the released units in reliance upon an "amended" 
Notice of Lien recorded just a few days following the lien 
release and following the December 12, 1983 recording of the 
Trust Deed securing Cottonwood's loans made on these units. 
Moreover, the attachment of the December 6, 1983 
release of lien to the amended notice recorded on December 30, 
1983 doesn't even have the effect plaintiff appears to believe 
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it has. Since the property description already included in the 
amended notice (in the form of a metes and bounds description 
of the entire Project and a copy of a map of the entire 
Project) purported to include Units FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1, the 
attaehnten »l lh' li i release as to those two units must be 
construed as excluding those units from the amended claim of 
lien (as well as from the original claim <t>f lien). Otherwise, 
plaintiff mcp aqam Tnnlaftjd ^ U> I by f-ulinq to a inquately 
describe the property purportedly subject to the amended notice. 
C o t t o n w o o cj thrift wab not bound by any side agreement 
between plaintiff and Bradshaw Development recorded after the 
fact. The release was complete on its face as to the units in 
question tnd recited adequate consi1ei ation in the torm ot a 
promise to pay, Tn light of the detrimental reliance by 
Cottonwood Thrift, and the benefit received by plaintiff 
through the inducement of that reliance, plaintiff cannot be 
heard to argue a different interpretation. See, Holbrook v. 
Webster'», In ., tah 2d I4H, 1?0 P,2d 661 11958); Harder 
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Fairfield Erectors, Inc., 564 
P.2d 1356 (Ore. 1977). 
UNDER § 38-1-18 AND RULE 54(d)(1), DEFENDANTS 
ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS1 
FEES INCURRED IN THE DISTRICT COURT AND ON 
THIS APPEAL, TO BE TAXED AS COSTS ON REMAND, 
IN AN AMOUNT TO BE DETERMINED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
Utah Code AIIII, \ M-I-1H (]Qr> ai amended) states: 
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38-1-18. Attorneys1 fees. 
In any action brought to enforce any 
lien under this chapter the successful party 
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
(emphasis added). 
Rule 54(d)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when 
express provision therefor is made either in 
a statute of this state or in these rules, 
costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal 
or other proceedings for review is taken, 
costs of the action, other than costs in 
connection with such appeal or other 
proceeding for review, shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. Costs against 
the State of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(emphasis added). 
It is settled that under § 38-1-18, a party who 
successfully defends against a mechanics1 lien claim is 
entitled to attorneys1 fees incurred both in the lower court 
and on appeal. AAA Fencing, supra; Petty Investment Co. v. 
Miller, 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978); Palombi v. D & C. Builders, 
22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). 
In their respective answers to plaintifffs Amended 
Complaint, Copper State Thrift, Cottonwood Thrift and Valley 
Bank all contended by way of their Twelfth Defense that they 
were entitled to their attorneys1 fees (R. 311, 344, 333). 
Although partially couched in terms of bad faith and without 
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reference to any specific statute, these requests for 
attorneys' fees (prepared by former counsel for defendants) are 
broad enough to include J ii in It dlfnrnpyjs1 Lees und<*r 
§ 38-1-18, Moreover, it wds also settled in Palombi that a 
part1' pn nlinq iqiiriol i m* 'hani ' lien claim is entitled to 
attorneys' fees under the statute, regardless of whether that 
party's pleadings ask for attorneys' fees. 
Defendants did I i I specific requerf tor 
attorneys' fees in their motion lor summary judgmentf and the 
District court's Order and Judgment of Dismissal is silent as 
to attorneys' fees, although it is certified as final under 
Rule 54(b) as to the mechanics' lien claim (the Third Claim in 
the \nuMidi il o ni p 1 i L it) against- I h< IM*jndant * p<-u t > 1 > this 
appeal. However, defendants' present request for attorneys' 
fees is entirely appropriate for several reasons: 
1, it uould not have been appropriate n I *MS n )t 
necessary for defendants to ask for their attorneys' fees in 
their not n for summary judgment. Unden § 38-1-18 defendants 
were not entitled to their fees unless and until they prevailed 
on that motion. M < , the issue of the amount of any 
attorney's fees iwat I I < r IM <>l M\J jonab lene; , 3 J fact 
issue that could not have been determined by summary judgment* 
See, Mason , Mason, 108 Utah 428, 16U P.z.d /30 (1945), 
Moreover, attorneys1 fees are taxed as costs under § .h-[-18r 
and under Rule 54(d)(1), costs must await} the outcome of this 
appeal. 
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2o It also would not have been appropriate and was 
not necessary for defendants to ask for their attorneys1 fees 
as costs subsequent to the award of summary judgment or for the 
District Court to deal with this issue either in its Order and 
Judgment of Dismissal or in a subsequent order, for these same 
reasons. Under Rule 54(d)(1), the prevailing party is entitled 
to costs unless the District Court orders otherwise, and the 
District Court retains continuing jurisdiction to determine 
costs after appeal. This only makes sense because the issue of 
whether defendants are the "successful" parties under 
§ 38-1-18, and the "prevailing" parties under 54(d)(1), will 
not be finally determined until this appeal is determined. Any 
attorneys1 fees determination in the District Court would be 
mooted by a reversal of the District Court's decision on the 
merits in this appeal, and thus, an unnecessary waste of 
judicial resources. 
3. Plaintiff has had and will have adequate notice 
of and opportunity to meet issues of defendants' entitlement to 
attorneys' fees and the amount of those fees. 
(a) Not only did defendants' respective Answers 
to the Amended Complaint ask for attorneys' feesr but 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint also specifically referenced 
§ 38-1-18 as the basis for plaintiff's own claim to attorneys' 
fees. Both the language of § 38-1-18 and the above-referenced 
and other decisions of this Court interpreting that statute, 
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make it clear that, unlike other statutes where attorneys1 fees 
are discretionary or require additional determinations beyond 
the BKjf if •> ot LltH tit,
 (iti M r d oi Mloijieys1 ft^s t f he 
party prevailing on the merits of the mechanics1 lien claim is 
mandatory under h )8~I-18. Accordingly, plaintiff was and is 
on notice that in defending against defendants1 motion for 
summary judgment on the merits, and in bringing this appeal 
cniitHsti in ho mpr i t ot th« I»MI<I I ummars liidnnvnt l< 
defendants, plaintiff was and is also litigating over 
defendants1 entitlement to attorneys1 fees as well. Plaintiff 
also will have further opporl mil v I i iddress these issues in 
its reply brief. 
(I i " I the amount ot attorneys1 fees to be 
awarded, assuming defendants prevail on this appeal and thereby 
establish their entitlement under AAA Fencing, supra, to fees 
incurred I iih in t ho Distri •!" '"otirt and on appeal, this Court 
can simply remand to the District Court for a hearing on the 
amount oi lees reasonably incurred both in the District Court 
and on appeal, as was done in AAA Fencing. At that time, 
defendants will be required to put on their evidence as to 
amount wM ot plointiff will have t ho opportunit fo contest, 
and the waste of judicial resources from having two hearings as 
to amount, one before appeal and one after, is avoided. 
4. The finality oi the District Court's 54U»i Order 
and Judgment of Dismissal for purposes of appeal is unaffected 
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by any unresolved issues regarding attorneys1 fees. Once 
again, because attorneys1 fees are taxed as costs under 
§ 38-1-18 and because under Rule 54(d)(1) an award of costs is 
made to the prevailing party unless otherwise ordered, and may 
be made after appeal, the District Court's Order and Judgment 
of Dismissal is final for purposes of appeal, and the 
attorneys' fees issues are preserved for purposes of this 
appeal and otherwise, even though the Order is silent as to 
fees. 
Although there appears to be no direct counterpart to 
Rule 54(d)(1) under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (upon 
which the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled), in White 
v, New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, 102 S.Ct. 
1162, 455 U.S. 445, 71 L.Ed.2d. 325 (1982), the U.S. Supreme 
Court interpreted the federal rules in a fashion similar to 
that suggested above. There, the prevailing plaintiff made a 
motion for attorneys' fees in a civil rights case long after 
final judgment was issued and even though fees were not 
requested in the Complaint. The motion was made under 42 
U.S.C. § 1988, authorizing attorneys' fees to a prevailing 
plaintiff in a civil rights case, which are also taxed as 
costs, as under § 38-1-18. The circuit court of appeals had 
treated the motion as an untimely request to alter or amend 
judgment under Rule 59(e). 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while 59(e) 
was intended to deal with relief on the merits, attorneys' fees 
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issues were collateral to and separable from the main cause of 
action, JII )arf because thpy ir^  not addressed until DIM party 
has prevailed on the merits. Accordingly, attorneys1 fees may 
be awarded even after an otherwise final order is entered and 
an ippeal t jk*Mir r^nl I lie finality ol HI OL I^ I leaving 
attorneys1 fees issues unresolved is not disturbed for purposes 
of appeal, See also, Cox v. Flood, 683 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 
1982 1? Masalosalo v. Stonewall Insurance Co,f *71 .1 K.^d 9b5, 
956-^57 (9th Cir. 1983); Jones v. Illinois Dep't. of 
Rehabilitation Services, 689 F..VJ "7 4, 731-73? f^ th Cii. 1982). 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, defendants urge 
that, in affirming the Order and Judgment of Dismissal, this 
Court determine that defendants are entitled to attorneys1 fees 
incurred on this appeal and in the District Court, and to 
remand hu purposes of i determine! ion i ; to tho imouni of 
those fees only. Defendants believe that under AAA Fencing and 
otherwise, and in order to avoid piecemeal appeals, such a 
determination unl innuml is appropriate, even though defendants 
have not filed a formal motion for attorneys1 fees in the 
District Court. Alternatively, defendants urge that the remand 
grant defendants leave to file such a motionr and direct the 
District Court to determine that motion in accordance with this 
Court * ' determination i^i" defendants as the prevailinq or 
successful parties. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully urge the Court to affirm the 
District Court's Order and Judgment of Dismissal, to award 
defendants their reasonable attorneys' fees incurred both in 
the District Court and on this appeal, and to remand for a 
determination as to the amounts of those fees only. 
Alternatively, defendants urge that the remand grant them leave 
to file a motion for attorneys' fees in the District Court, and 
direct the District Court to determine that motion in 
accordance with this Court's determination of defendants as the 
successful or prevailing parties. 
''1 V '-
DATED this ' / day of December, 1986. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
\ 
/ 
By ^l/t ^ u y ~'/~^<:^'~ - - ^-
James A. Boevers 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondants 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this -7"t day of December, 1986, I hereby certify 
that I caused to be mailed, postage prepalid, four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS 
ti) the f o 1 1 D W i nq ; 
Robert F. Babcock 
Darrel J. Bostwick 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
6527G 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
3869182 
:#t£M RECO*D£Ot HMl TO* 
Projects Unlimited lac. 
302 West 5400 South 
*¥T*»V» VStfr H107. Space Above for Recorder's Use 
1
 ' • • •** * '• "•" • *' • '"""" • * •'••"'" • • 'NOTICE OF LIEN* 
The una* signed _ Frojti?^ VftUHttd ! « • — 
3?2 w « " S40Q South, Murray, tftfh 84107 
hereby gives notice of Intention to hold and claim a Hen upon the property and 
Improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by Bradahi Development 
and located In _ County* 
., more particularly described as follows: _ . r^SP 2 
tae eihlhh "A" ittaeted 
^ ^ f". K 2000 
t 
r ** * 
r 
The amount claimed hereby 1s ^42,162.04 ____. contract amount and _,_.„„,_ 
(28.804.00) extras plus interest, costs and attorneys fees for furnishing labor, mai 
eHal. and equipment for the construction of Improvements upon the above described 
property. 
The undersigned furnished said labor, material and equipment and was Employed by 
_,._.„,„. Bradahaw Development , , _ — _ „ „ -,,,,,-,,,,,,,,_,-,_,„.- ....... — -
who was the 
under a contract made between Bradahaw Development 
-# such being done by the undersigned 
and the undersigned by the terms and conditions of which the undersigned did agree to 
to bull/*, condominium and to further improve the property by performing _
 a, _ ^ 
•ite and utility Improvements. _ — — _ - _ _ _ _ » . C/t 
zr:_zz z_ $ 
1n consideration o< pa«"wl to the undersigned therefore as follcws: 
95X of the monthly progreaa billing. ,,„..„,,,,,„.., _ _ _ _ „ , „ » , „ m 
and under which contrail the first labor, material and equipment was performed on the 
10 day of October
 f 19r and the last was so furnished or performed on -4f 
*
n
* ? day of October 19 J2_ and *cr all of which labor, mat 
erlai and equipment the undersigned became entitled to S 595.^33.93 which 1s the 
reasonable value thereof, and on which payments have bet.i v*e and credits and offsets 
allowed amounting to $ irv\AJA «y,, leaving i balance owing to the undersigned of 
EXHIBIT "A" 
* 1*3.317.51 after deducting a M just credits and offsets, M6 for which 
temriti the undersigned holds **4 claims a Hen by virtue of the provisions of Chapter lt 
Title 38, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
yfLtfte^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County o ss. 
ne 1s .M^4**^ 
being first duly sworn, says that 
claimant 1n the foregoing 
Notice of Lien; that he has read said notice and knows the contents thereof, and that 
the same is true of his own knowledge. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / 4 day of ^ f a o U ' t l m » V P 3 
Notary Ptib H e 
fa/.mJSSJ''/ 
2 
3 
f 
I.HIIMT "A" 
lefltnnlKf wt * ••-.k.,1 «*^ ••* j»'i.(b*tf» u a tiUM v«..- >w.ut«e«it Corner of 
Lot S. BlwcV. 1 . Twt> K..r« f i « t "•»•, j i g Fle lu Survey, U a l d point 
l w i \ > 4 «n k 1/?. « l / « . S*ct1«.i '#. T?S, Rll 5LB I N); thence S 
M * * * W K i<3.»00 u * t ; thence N 0V«4*J** E 38. 9. thence $ 8»*«?*00* 
U 38.5904 f t * t ; thence N 89*'>"»11" E ftij.4100 feet; thence 
Southeasterly alony the ere of a 200.00 f t . radtnt curve to the riant 
8.7600 feet, ( low chord bearing * S 18*14'0? t ) ; thence S WWyr I 
10J.8600 feet. tUence S 0*04*3?* M 0.430* feet; thence N 89*57 ' l ; * E 
tnewce N 0*04*3/:* E f.OCOO feet; thence N 89*57*11* E 
tfcence S Q"04'32a W 8.9600 faet; tfcence N 89*57*11* 
•5.0000 feet. 
70.CO00 f**t; E 
37.6604 f i t t ; tt<«c« • 2 I * W M * W M.4000 feet; tltence N 19*38*00" U 
1 ? 5 . 7 J 3 C f a i t ; U*>"« N 11*07*00* W 68.9000 feet; thence N 89*38*00* U 
152.610a faat; f i m 4 Soul* M.74O0 feat; thence M 89*38'00* W 20.0000 
f*«t ; ti«»:« *»ort*» 3. IW0 feet; tneoct West €10.7001 feet; thence South 
ttO.lUjd feet; tf*iNM S 89*5*'S0* E S7i.»*«* feet ale** An e«1stfnf 
fence to tfca Polwt of teffaiifRf;. Centalat l»74 acre* • / - . 
PLANNW; COMMISSION 
WVK- .':!. THU 1'AY OF 
A I' " KYTHIMAITLAKF 
. VHKTY ll-ANNINC -OMMISSION 
:| (AMMAN PLANNING OOMM 
BOARD OF HEALTH 
•IHCVr 'HI. 
DIRECTOR. 
f^ . 
HOAhP f i f i.« AI.TI 
fil£ ' * ISRT^* 
L* f .K{ SUPFLT g)B 
ADDEND! JM " B " 
wflw xnono, MAIL IOI 'lK«7l5fi • » » • -yr— — ^ r-
t>30 |JLVU I^TIEL. DIXON, Aa*o*af 
P10J3CT9 tUXHITSD PIC. . ^ „ SaJI Us* Co*** Utah 
;7Sg, — 
302 VEST 3*00 SOOTH SUIT! 206 A * 
WURBAY. tfT 84107 _ — _ _ Spaca AboW^&Tacordar'a Uaa 
» loneg or urn* 
Hit undersigned Projacta Ohllaltad lac. 
502 Vest 5400 South Suite 206A. Hurray. Iff 84107 
haraby airea notice of iataatlon to hold and claia a lain upon tha property and 
iapwreaenta tharson owned and raputad to ba owned by Bradaha* Daralopasnt 
_ _ _ _ . — •*•" located in Ctaaitj 
Utah, aora particularly daacribad aa folloaat 
Saa fechibits "A , J*. - attaehad 
Tha aaount claiaad haraby it 642,162.04 contract aaount andt^  
(28.804.00) extras plua interaat, eoata aad attornaye twm fox furnialiing labor, aat-
erlal, and equipment for tha construction of iaporraaenta upon tha above daacribad 
property* 
Tha undersigned furnished said labor, aatarial aad equipment aad aaa aaployad by 
Bradshaw Development _ _ _
 nm mmmmm __ _ _ _ _ _ _ » 
aho aaa tha 
Owner » nucn being doaa by tha undersigned 
under a contract aade batwaan Bradahaw Development _
 mmmm _ mmmmmmmmm 
n^il the underaignad by fhr tarma and conditions of which tha undersigned did agree to 
build condominiums aad to further improve tha property by performing aita aad 
utility laporveaonta. _ _ _ _ _ —, — _ — _ - _ „ 
.- maideration of payaent to tha undersigned therefore aa followsim 
95% of the aonthly progress billing. _ _ _ _ _ 
s 
aad under which contract the flnt labor, aatarial aad equipment vaa parforaad oo tha 
10 day of Oetobar . 19 62 aad tha laat vaa ae fumiahad or parforaad on 
tha 7 day of Oetobar 19 83 aad for all of whieh laborf ami* 
arial aad equipment tha undersigned becaae entitled to I 59^.735.93 whieh la CD 
tha reasonable valua theraof, aad on which payaenta have bean aada aad oradita aad offaata 
allowed aaouatin^ to I 315.218.42 leaving a balance owning to tha uaderalgnad of 
• i » l T "A-2 
< 1HM17-*! aftsx dodueting all Juat credits and offsets, aad f«? which 
daaaad tho undsrsignsd holda aad elaiaa a lien by rlrtu* of tho proriaions of Chapter 1, 
Title 38. Utah Codo Annotated 1953* 
STATE OP UTAH, 
County of 
ho is 
being first duly sworn, aayo that 
claimant ___ in tho foregoing 
Notice of Lion* that ho has road said notieo and knows tho contents thereof, sad that 
tho ease ia true of his own knowledge. 
Subscribed and swore to before no this 
lortary Public 
A 
8 
trs"5519 rur 500 
H16HUH0 CmCHA8D$ CONDOMINIUMS P.U.O. PROJECT PROPERTY DESCRIPTION | ~ — * . 
Beginning at * point North 383.0200 ftet froa J * Southeast Corner of 
U t S, Hoc* 1 , Ten Acre H a t •AB . ,81g'F|t l J Survey. Ua1d point 
located 1n f l A . NV 1/4. S^tlon. 4. T2S, 8 Z, SU I N); thence S 
8«*£Z'O0" r 30.5900 foot; thence N 0*04*32*! E 3 .59, thence S 89*52*00" 
W 38.5900 f ta t . thence N 89*57'11* 'E 33.4100 feet; thence 
Southeasterly along the arc of a 200.00 f t . ra Hits curve to the right 
8.7600 feet, (long chord bearing • S 18"14'p7* I ) ; thence S 69*52'00c E 
103.8600 feet; thenct S 0*04'32* V 0.430a fee ; thence N 89*57'U* E 
65.0000 feet; thence 8 0*04'32* E 9.0000 fee , thence N 69*57'11* E 
70.0000 feet; thence S 0*04(32a If 8.9800 fee ;•thence N 69*S7'11" E 
37.8600 feet; thane* • *ro**56" V 54.400Q fe«t; thence N 19*38'00* W 
'125.7300 foot; thence 0 11*07'00" V 68.900Q feet; thence N 89*38*00" W 
152.9100 foeti thenct South 58.7600 feet; thenct M 89*38*00* U 20.0000 
feet; tfc«Kt *0rth 3,C,9QQ feet; thenct West 6S0.70CJ). feet; thence South 
1B0,1P00 fat*; t*anct S B9"S2*PQ* E 370.8*0 feet along an casting 
fenw t * ^ # brlnt or 8«gfftflf«f. Co* Mint Jb* •cres •>/-. 
•*'M'. 7CANWING COMMISSION '•" 
APPROVED THIS . . . . . DAY OF 
AD 19. HYTHESA1TU1X 
COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 
CHAIRMAN (BANNING OOMM 
f BOARD OF HEALTH 
APPI OVKO THIS 
or _ . 
M&S2L 
A D . id 
BOAhP Of hHALT. 

V ** 1< .\JhN oY i - «K i -..r.S: 
i^e n'c.aV^ r°r« *ation for and in consideration of &c sum of. _.f//A££OL. 
'• ! lY- * ' ^ \ 0 ^ y « - ^ T = l Dolhit, 
•V* '*A 
V *
 4 I4jt t * h :s )fc-.r-!.y nctju,\vIe?£odt do<»s hereby release, satisfy and dfecHr^ e that certain 
cVm of lian dated the — tfc- _ day of \ 'c^.ifek<a. l*9-£2, and recorded in the 
(>'" e «•! ^e Co ,-:iy Run,' r of . /?'* i f /*£££?«* _ _ . . C^nty, State of Utih, 
i * ' ^'^Z- r *#-£ / /, 's L' \: vat N'o J . . - a-* jst f 5 f J!o*irg described 
rtal property in , j g f e g , g l i /"THf* County, Utah: tfr^rr ^ l \ - / * 2 . Ife*!/- te^-r 
4H**»IH *«, OAT m , ^ , wc^r* rtovv^T 
1*4 -HIOTUC/^JO txrfl^rocs -2**ptvu5Kpr4 » 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Corporation has caused this document to be ex- | 
ecu ted by its duly authorized officers 
ATTEST: 
z^P 
7 .i&r.'1" Secretary 
lS.fto, personally appeared before no 
,, who being by me duly er-orn did say that bo fa the 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument, *s£ that said instrument rs* c> 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of Hn board of director! tad omid ^ 
T^WiO it. UJ*t*f _ _ acknowfej^ d to me thai told g 
corporation executed the same, 
My Comr'iaion Expiree _ 
~ ~ Residing tt* /jZ'mfitt - /& Mot* $ 
~*z m9\ c*vc orucf i .ee • • * *O*M—*««.*.«•• i f « «i•*•» •»JTM.• t c wt«« 
ADDENDUM "C" 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Jon C. Heaton (1444) 
James A. Boevers (0371) 
Attorneys for Defendants: 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co. 
Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Co. 
Valley Bank & Trust Co. 
Western Savings & Loan Co. 
Third Floor MONY Plaza 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-3760 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO., 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
CHARLES BRAZIER 
Civil No. C84-1644 
(Judge Judith M. Billings) 
STATE OF OREGON ) 
COUNTY OF [ MAsT'lly/llb ss. 
CHARLES BRAZIER, being duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and statel as follows: 
1. I am over 21 years of age, have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth below, unless otherwise 
indicated, and am competent in all respects to give testimony 
in this action. 
2. I was employed by defendant Cottonwood Thrift & 
Loan during the time when the following events occurred* 
3. I have reviewed the January 24, 1986 Affidavit of 
Phil Hofstetter in Response to Affidavit of John Bradshaw and 
the January 27, 1986 Affidavit of David Mast on file in this 
action. 
4. As indicated in the Certified Foreclosure Report 
attached to the Mast affidavit, in December, 1983, Cottonwood 
Thrift loaned Bradshaw Development Company $61,428.00, secured 
by a Deed of Trust as to Unit FF-11-A2 of the Highland Orchards 
Condominiums, Phase 1. At the same time, Cottonwood Thrift 
also made a similar loan as to Unit FF-5-A1. On behalf of 
Cottonwood Thrift, I participated in the decision to make these 
loans. 
5. Once application for these loans was made, 
Cottonwood Thrift became aware of the recording of a Notice of 
Lien by plaintiff Projects Unlimited, Inc., a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by 
reference. Cottonwood Thrift decided not to make these loans 
unless the Exhibit "A" Notice of Lien was completely released 
as to Units FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1. 
6. Prior to the time these loans were made, 
Cottonwood Thrift became aware that on December 8, 1983, a 
Release of Lien pertaining to Units FF-11-A2 and FF-5-A1 was 
recorded, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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7. Cottonwood Thrift interpreted the Exhibit "B" 
Release of Lien to be "partial" only in that the Exhibit "A" 
Notice of Lien pertained to the entire Highland Orchards 
Project, while the Exhibit "B" Release pertained only to two 
units within that project. However, Cottonwood Thrift also 
interpreted the Exhibit "B" Release to be a total release as to 
those two units and relied upon that interpretation in making 
the two loans. Without a complete release as to those two 
units, Cottonwood Thrift would never have made these loans, and 
was induced to make these loans by the recording of the Exhibit 
"B" Release. As indicated in the Foreclosure Report attached 
to the Mast affidavit, the Trust Deed establishing Cottonwood 
Thrift's security interest in Unit FF-11-A2 was dated 
December 9, 1983, one day after the recording of the Release of 
Lien, and this Trust Deed was recorded on December 12, 1983, 
four days after recording of the Exhibit "B" Release. 
DATED this t day of March, 1986. 
A 
^LLL^I 
CHARLES BRAZIER , 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this I *+ day of 
March, 1986.
 / / 
My Commission Expires: 
_ ?• T- To 
Notary Public />; / ,, 
Residing at ^&uJt£*\a ,fVK 
6182G 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 17th day of March, 1986, I hereby certify that 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT of 
CHARLES BRAZIER to be hand-delivered to the following: 
Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
620 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
The Honorable Judith M. Billings 
Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(Courtesy Copy) 
and a copy (without exhibits) of the Affidavit of Charles 
Brazier, along with copies (without exhibits) of the Reply 
Memorandum, Affidavit of Donald S. Poulton, Affidavit of Steve 
Beckstead, Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of Phil 
Hofstetter and David Mast and Notice of Hearing, and Ex-Parte 
Motion and Order for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation (copies of 
which were hand-delivered to Ellen Maycock and Judge Judith M. 
Billings on March 14, 1986) to be mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, to the following: 
Dennis W. Haslam 
Kathy A. F. Davis 
WINDER &*HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Cottonwood Thrift & Loan 
_^« 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS 
185 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Copper State Thrift & Loan 
Allen Sims 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Valley Bank & Trust Company 
Richard A. Rappaport 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Carolyn Nielsen 
Richard H. Nebeker 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Richard H. Casper 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gary E. Doctorman 
BEILE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Matthew F. Hilton 
1024 East Country Lane 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Bruce A. Maak 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
185 South State, #1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
6182G 
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^:. %est S~Q0 bcatn, Murray. Ita^i P4107 
hereby cn»es nonce of *rt*ntion to ho'd anc cla*T a lien upon :re proDe^t/ arc 
•'"orove-e^ts thereon owned and reDuted to he owned by Bradsnjw neveiop«aent 
ind located *n
 m__m Countv, 
Utah, ^o'e D^fc-'er'y described as follows: 
see exploit "A" attached 
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ST 
r 
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the 7 day o r October , '9 § i_ and *or all of which labor, nat-
er1a, anc equipment the undersigned became ent^t'td to S 39S.73S.V3 • wMch *% the 
reasonable value thereof, and on wh*ch payments have been made and credUs *n* offsets 
J *—^»i« f l *n % /f>o ?18 L1 l e a v e s * balance ow<ng to the undersigned zf 
c :r Scaucting all just credits and oftsets, and for which 
:ef-ni. ' r urce-sujnea holds .nd claims a lien by virtue of the provisions OT Chapter 1, 
rule 36, dts- Co^e Annotatec 1953. 
J/772&*-
President 
xs. i</yu_Ml*Z\? 
Secretary 
U 
SH7E OF UTAH, ; 
County of d-Ju J^JLAJL^ 
S5. 
ne *s £W4<A>'^ 
_ being first duly sworn, sdys that 
claimant in the foregoing 
Notice cf Lien, tnat he has read said notice and knows the contents thereof, and that 
fie same is true of his own knowledge 
^L^/.-pTZ*'-
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J^f day of _ J ^ 1. *1L 
V 
en 
3 
31 
- o S- * 
o 3 £ e 
X . **» S M O X T 
« • • © 3 •-
. _ o s o c * 
, _ o c 
^ •* * 
3 ^ * * 
K x, * 
»r = »g 
* ^ ft -i 
• - « ** • P 
—• •* *
 ?Se 
£ --> 
?«> 
- 5 * -a 
* * * ; • » 
^ s * * * - • * 8 
V 
i 
«• ^ ^ o 
. I S A 
5 2 * m ** 
a
-.>«i5 
«* %f & U * 
r- L« > l* 
91 
T *» U
 V 
* - - i S 31 ^» n mm *- W , . , «» 
r i 
i 
*, *- *- •# «» • %» * v • .c I < 
* • 
o 
-ffi ?*£***- JRZL * c ? ,P r TTF^-
&) 
JOrC- AU. UZS BY W t U PR2TT.NT3: 
Ti* aadr-aj-jod Cbrpmiiss tor tad to oonaldarttSoa of Ifct n o «* ^ ^ **r 
* « ^ g ^ V . 
-IVntifi» 
kotoby altitt, »Us£y tai dfepatrp tfeit 
cfaLa cf Ucn dttod tfat ££ (toy of l t n ^ r ^ ' 3 if fi?. tod m ^ to tU 
CL\-e ^ ii* County JUevdtr U rffcfr" IfX-t* CftJty. itoto tl Utah, 
to & C : L C Z ^ Pift £ 7 7 . m iMtruaces: No. { T tpinft tf» Libra* 4msSM 
D: WTTNLSS WHT3SCF, tbt underrjMd Corpcniba tov 
•eaisi by its duly tnthohad ofSan 1 tyof PV7rv*r l , 
ttua to too** 
*£2km3Z& -^DZ. 
S.- - c! 
cc-.~~ - sr;7,r^-' 
1 •*--'•*. 
-H 
- - —v-
t^psirad bvf?r^  sa 
.-: the: ogsutyi sbs tirrr-s cd £E~rrss iia-u:m.A erf this 
. L—:oi ail ccrTcri'.'n fc;- tc~.?r.^* cf t ss-l^Jca of to fcst:. 
- . — rrst.! £a BLT~ * 
e l l Jaisrjssii « ? 
\ r 
• x. ^ j c . r~ JX 
EXHIBIT " B " 
t=9> 
It 
ill 
:i 5 a 
I 
ADDENDUM "D" 
PRINCE. YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Jon C. Heaton (1444) 
James A. Boevers (0371) 
Attorneys for Defendants: 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co. 
Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Co. 
Valley Bank & Trust Co. 
Western Savings & Loan Co. 
Third Floor MONY Plaza 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-3760 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
: OF DISMISSAL 
vs. : 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO., : Civil No. C84-1644 
INC., a Utah corporation, : (Judge Judith M. Billings) 
et al., : 
Defendants. : 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendants Copper 
State Thrift & Loan Co., Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Co., Valley 
Bank & Trust Co. and Western Savings & Loan Co., and the 
plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment were 
heard by the Court in a special setting at 11:00 a.m., on 
Friday, March 21, 1986. Plaintiff was represented by Ellen 
Maycock, the above-named moving defendants were represented by 
James A. Boevers, and Bruce A. Maack appeared on behalf of 
defendants Deseret Pacific Mortgage and A. Scott Kafesjian. 
The Court heard oral argument and reviewed the memoranda and 
affidavits submitted by the moving parties, as well as the 
other matters of record. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Court ruled from the bench that: 
1. The motion of defendant Cottonwood Thrift & Loan 
Co. would be granted based on undisputed facts establishing 
Cottonwood Thrift's reasonable reliance upon a recorded Partial 
Release of Lien given by plaintiff that was complete on its 
face as to the condominium unit in question. 
2. The motion of defendant Valley Bank & Trust Co. 
would be granted based on the undisputed fact that Valley Bank 
was not named as a party defendant within the twelve month 
period specified in Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-11 (1953, as 
amended). In this regard, the Court ruled that there was no 
unity of interest as between Valley Bank and any of the parties 
defendant against which this action was timely brought, and 
that neither Valley Bank's actual nor constructive knowledge of 
the recorded Lis Pendens excused the failure to bring action 
against Valley Bank within the statutory period. 
3. Plaintiff's claims against defendant Western 
Savings & Loan Co. would be dismissed based on stipulation of 
counsel. 
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4. The motion of defendant Copper State Thrift & 
Loan Cd., and the plaintiff's cross-motion* which sought relief 
only against Copper State, would be taken under advisement, and 
plaintiff was given leave to file a memorandum within five days 
after the hearing, addressing arguments made in defendants' 
Reply Memorandum dated March 14, 1986. 
Thereafter, by Memorandum Opinion dated March 28, 
1986, the Court ruled that the motions of Copper State, as well 
as those of the other moving defendants, would be granted, and 
the plaintiff's cross-motion would be denied, based on grounds 
more fully set forth in the Memorandum Opinion. Based on the 
Memorandum Opinion, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on 
the moving defendants' motion to strike portions of certain 
affidavits submitted in support of plaintiff's cross-motion, 
which motion to strike was also argued at the March 21, 1986 
hearing. 
Therefore, based on the foregoing grounds, on grounds 
set forth in the Court's March 28, 1986 Memorandum Opinion and 
on grounds otnerwise set forth in the moving defendants' 
memoranda on file, the Court hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES, as follows: 
1. That the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
defendants Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., Cottonwood Thrift & 
-3-
Loan Co., Valley Bank & Trust Co. and Western Savings & Loan 
Co. is hereby granted, the plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby denied, and the Third Claim for Relief in 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed in its 
entirety, with prejudice and on the merits, no cause of action, 
as against the above-named moving defendants. 
2. That pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court hereby expressly determines that there is 
no just reason for delay and expressly directs the Clerk to 
enter this Order and Judgment of Dismissal as the final 
judgment as to plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief against the 
above-named moving defendants. 
DATED this cTl day of April, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
& / 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this ff& day of April, 1986, I hereby certify that 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL to the 
following: 
Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
620 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Dennis W. Haslam 
Kathy A, F. Davis 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 40Q4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Cottonwood Thrift & Loan 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS 
185 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Copper State Thrift & Loan 
Allen Sims 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Valley Bank & Trust Company 
Richard A, Rappaport 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Carolyn Nielsen 
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6219G 
Richard H. Nebeker 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Richard H. Casper 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gary E. Doctorman 
BEILE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Matthew F. Hilton 
1024 East Country Lane 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Bruce A. Maack 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
185 South State, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM "E" 
MECHANICS' LIENS 38-1-7 
\ C N. Zundel & Associates (1979) 600 P 2d materials by another contractor, both con-
521 tractors' projects must have been performed 
The priority of all mechanic's liens arising in connection with what is essentially a sin-
from a project is determined by the date of gle project performed under a common plan 
commencement of work on the project site or prosecuted with reasonable promptness and 
furnishing materials on the site and the without material abandonment, however, 
release of his claims and liens by the lien ordinary maintenance and cleanup work does 
holder who so commenced work or initially not constitute a sufficient basis to permit 
furnished materials does not affect the prior- "tacking" in order to fix an earlier lien date 
ity of other liens. First of Denver Mortgage under this section for labor and materials 
Inxestors v. C. N. Zundel & Associates (1979) supplied. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson (1982) 
MOP 2d 521. 652 P 2d 922. 
Koi one contractor's lien to relate back to 
the commencement of work or supplying of 
.18-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — Service on owner of 
property. {1} Every original contractor within 100 days after the completion of 
his contract, and except as [hereafter] provided in this section, every person other 
than the original contractor [claiming] who claims the benefit of this chapter 
within 80 days after furnishing the last material or performing the last labor for 
or on any land, building, improvement or structure, or for any alteration, addition 
to, [tir] repair [thereof] of, [ttr] performance of any labor in, or furnishing any mate-
rials for, any mine or mining claim, [must] shall file for record with the county 
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part [thereof] of the property, 
is situated1 [ft eJa+m m writing, containing] a written notice [of intention] to hold 
and claim a lien[; and]. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement [of his demand after deducting aH just 
credits and offsets, with] setting forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or2 if not known, the name of the 
record owner[; and ate©]; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he w£s employed or to whom he furnished 
the material[; with a statement of the terms; time given and conditions of -his eon-
tract, spoeifying]: 
(c) the time when the first and last labor was performed, or the first and last 
material was furnishedf; and also]; 
(d) a description of the property [to fee charged with the Hen], sufficient for 
JLiL 11 111 l L C 4 L l U I I [ | VI J I 1 U 1 vToTTTT TTTTTov U1Z TTTTTTTTTI U j t u v vTCTCTT KJT 1 1 1 1 1 U U 1 v r ^ T 31H1IC UVIIC1 
person?]; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent, and the date 
signed. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing [said] the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall 
deliver or mail by certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of 
the real property a copy of the [said] notice of lien. [Where] If the record owner's 
current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may be mailed to 
the last known address of the record owner2 using [for stteh purpose] the names 
and addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of 
the county where the affected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the 
notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner [shall prevent] precludes the 
lien claimant from [collection of interest or] an award of costs and attorneys' fees 
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(4) When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as stated 
[above] in Subsections (1) through (3) at the [instance ttrt^] request of an original 
contractor, then [sueh subcontractor's or person's \ien rights, as set forth herein, 
are extended so as to make] the final date for the filing of a notice of intention 
195 
EXHIBIT "B" 
3S-1-10 LIKNS 
to hold and claim a lien for a subcontractor or a person furnishing labor or mate-
rial at tjie request of an original contractor is 80 da\s after completion of the origi-
nal contract of the original contractor 
History KS ls«is At C L PM)7, $ IM> 
C h W 7 5? 17 U> 1 P H l . c h d U R S l<m 
k C 1M|{ r,2 1 7 1 l«M«i (h M U , 1 W (h 
l i t <H 1«»M eh 1i»'» * 1 lWi ,<h 107 $1 
C o m p i l e r s Notes. 
The 1€l?*» intendment increased the turn 
for filing for record near the beginning of the 
first p a n g r t p h fr«»tu sO to 100 days for ongi 
nal contractors and trom oO to 80 days for 
suhiontiactois, ine it asul the tune for filing 
a notice of intention to hold and claim a lien 
in the second paragraph from b0 to 80 da \ s , 
and made a minor change in phraseology 
The 1%1 amendment substituted "name of 
the reputed owner if known or if not known, 
the name of the record owner" in the first 
sentence of the first paragraph for 'name of 
the owner and added the last three sen-
tences in th« fust patagiaph 
S u b s h i n t u i l c o m p l i a n c e wi th not ice 
requirements. 
In icgaids to tin stalutor\ requirements 
for giving notice of intention to claim a 
Relation back 
Th< prion!\ of all mechanic's liens arising 
fiom t proji < t is determined b\ the date of 
commc mement of work on the project site or 
furnishing mater ia ls on the site and the 
38-1-11. Enforcement, etc. 
Execution 
Lien waiver obtained from unauthorized 
<mplo\«e of subcontractor was \alid where 
testimony showed that cont rac tor had a 
standing piactice of obtaining lien waivers 
fiom that eniplovee for the purpose of 
obtaining payments on other jobs and in 
turn making payments to subcont rac tor 
Let«rand Johnson Constr Co v Kennedy 
i]°T>) ,>n P2d 10\fr 
Lis pendens 
Where plaintiff contractor installed a 
w tie t Inn which w is in improvement upon 
two lots but ueorded a lis pendens on only 
one lot the lien was not void where the 
defendant was present and represented by 
mechanic's lien the doctrine of substantial 
compliance has validity and application in an 
appiopnate case however theic was a Jack 
of substantial compli ime with the statutory 
mpi i t t m« tits end the notice wis mv did 
where the notice of lien failed to set forth 
the name of the pe ison to whom the maten 
als yyere furnished and did not contain a 
name appe uing to ide ntify th« person vinfv 
ing the claim and did not contain a signature 
of the pe rson who purportedly swore under 
oath as to the veracity of the claim Graff v 
Boise Cascade Corp <1<)K lM>b0 P M 721 
Verification. 
Where a corporate acknowledgment, as set 
out in 57-2 7 was use*d instead of a sworn 
statement that the contents of the lien notice 
were true the ben notice wa« not properly 
verified and w »> invalid 1 irst Security Mort 
gage Co v Hansen U9M>bU P 2d 919 
release of his claims ind liens by the hen 
holder who so commenced work or initially 
furnish* d m it« n ds doe s not affe < t the prior 
ity of other hens First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors y C \ Zunde I & Associates ( l W ) 
600 P 2d 521 
counsel at t r ial and the president of the 
defendant company had actual knowledge of 
the proceeding Harris Dudley Plumbing Co 
v Profession.il United Woild Trivel Assn 
(1979) r>92P 2d r>80 
Waiver and estoppel. 
Foreclosure of lien was properly denied 
where evidence disclosed existing practice of 
dealing between contractor and subcontrac 
tor, whereby subcontractor executed blank 
lien waivers and releases to contractor and 
gave contractor authority to complete the 
instruments lien w uvi r ix ieut id ic cording 
to such piocedure was valid LtGrand John-
son Constr Co v Kennedy (197')) S11 P 2d 
103b 
38-1-10. Laborers* and materialmen's hen on equal footing, etc. 
196 
